Dr. Quansheng Zhao

Member of:
Global Forum for Chinese Political Scientists

“China Must Shake off the Past in Ties with Japan”

Op-ed in The Straits Times (Singapore), November 7, 2003, p. 20

Also reprinted in The Korean Herald, November 9, 2003, p. 10, and The Asahi Shimbun, November 24, 2003, p. 19.

IN THE autumn of last year, I spent a three-month sabbatical at the European Institute of Japanese Studies in Stockholm, Sweden, while also conducting lectures and interviews in several European countries.

One of the issues I explored was the European experience in building regional communities, including the European Union. Among the intriguing questions was how hatred between former enemies such as the French and Germans could be overcome, and what the implications were for East Asian countries, China and Japan in particular.

One of the key points, according to my European colleagues, is to remove mistrust among different peoples and to enhance grassroots educational and cultural exchanges.

The experience enhanced my belief that China, Japan and East Asia as a whole should learn from the European experience.

Let me begin by stating that the problem between China and Japan does not lie only on one side. Japan should certainly bear responsibility for its reluctance to fully recognise the bitter feelings that exist in China, the two Koreas and other Asian countries, caused by its invasion during World War II.

Japan should seriously examine its policy towards China, specifically regarding issues such as the Prime Minister's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, and school textbooks' distortion of Japanese wartime behaviour.

Japan's Cold War mentality also needs to be shifted.

My primary focus in this article, however, is the China side of the issue.

China's relations with Japan have undergone a number of ups and downs in the past century. There was a honeymoon period immediately after ties were normalised in 1972, helped by shared concern over the perceived expansionism of the former Soviet Union, and the rapprochement between China and the United States.

Bilateral relations soured in the late 1980s and early 1990s, primarily because of the end of the Cold War, and the Tiananmen incident of 1989.

The political relationship further deteriorated throughout the 1990s, even as economic integration between the two countries was enhanced.

This decline of rapport was highlighted in the aftermath of then Chinese president Jiang Zemin's visit to Japan in 1998. Although both sides officially hailed the visit as a success, it is commonly perceived in Japan that it was a disaster, further hurting China's image in virtually all circles of Japanese society.

Indeed, mutual perceptions within the two countries reached a new low. According to public opinion surveys conducted by the Japanese Cabinet Secretariat, the proportion of Japanese who felt 'friendly' towards China fell from 78.6 per cent in 1980 to 51.6 per cent in 1989 and further slid to 47.8 per cent in 2001.

Similarly, the negative perception of Japan in China also became more evident. According to a Chinese Academy of Social Sciences survey, only 5.9 per cent felt 'friendly' towards Japan, whereas 43.3 per cent felt 'unfriendly'.

It is time for both Beijing and Tokyo to re-examine their foreign policies towards each other. One of the most important items for Beijing is priority-setting in its foreign policy directions.

CHANGING PRIORITIES

THERE have been different concerns in China's Japan policy in different periods. During the Mao Zedong era, the primary considerations were strategic issues such as the Beijing-Washington-Moscow triangle.

Mao viewed Japan first as an intermediate zone (together with Western Europe) between the Third World (which included China) and the two superpowers. Then he regarded Japan as a counterbalance to perceived Soviet expansionism.

In the Deng Xiaoping era, the top consideration was how China could receive assistance from, and cooperate with, Japan for its economic modernisation.

However, when Mr Jiang became president, the top priority seemed to switch to the issue of history. There is no doubt Japan's invasion of China and the memories that the Chinese people have of it are an important part of China's Japan policy. But it is questionable whether it is wise to place this concern at the top, above such issues as strategic and economic priorities, and the question of Taiwan.

China may also learn from its own experience with South-east Asian countries. When it adopted a self-centred, heavy-handed approach towards the latter in the 1960s and 1970s, what followed was a foreign policy disaster.

Beginning in the 1980s and particularly in the 1990s, it switched to a soft-mannered and economics-oriented foreign policy, acting as a partner instead of a predominant force in the region. This led to much improved relations between China and Asean countries.

China's Japan policy should follow similar lines. Chinese leaders should be careful to avoid being perceived as arrogant and intervening in another country's internal affairs.

Beijing may be well aware that public lectures about and heavy criticism of historical issues may not necessarily be productive and effective.

A first- rate foreign policy is built upon accurate knowledge and recognition of the current reality, as well as the country's own national interest. The basic trend in Japan for the past half century is towards a more democratic country, moving away from past militarism, and towards being the second largest economy in the world (despite the recent decade-long economic recession).

Conservative politicians' statements and right-wing actions are, from time to time, reported in the media. But this behaviour should not be regarded as mainstream in Japanese society and politics.

In the Mao era, top Chinese leaders such as premier Zhou Enlai and Politburo member Liao Chengzhi either had personal experience or extensive knowledge of Japan. It is urgent for the current leadership to fully utilise available Japan experts for the formulation of its Japan policy.

It is also logical for Beijing to take another look at its education policy for Chinese youth, and make it more reflective of the current situation in Japan and the general international environment.

BROADER CONTEXT

CHINA'S cooperative policy with Japan in the economic dimension, including trade, investment and proposals for future free trade agreements, is quite successful. China should fully appreciate Japan's official development assistance over the past 2 1/2 decades, and place its relations with Japan in the context of regional community building.

Take the bullet-train project from Beijing to Shanghai, for example. It is, of course, Beijing's prerogative whether the project should be given to the Japanese or the Europeans. There are economic and technological considerations.

But there is also nothing wrong with China considering the larger strategic and regional context into which this project fits.

China may also wish to consider developing a workable security framework with Japan. This new framework may include such sensitive issues as the North Korea nuclear crisis, potential conflict across the Taiwan Strait, and US military presence in East Asia.

It is not realistic for China to pull Japan away from the Japan-US security arrangement, but it is nevertheless important that its Japan policy is placed in a global strategic context. This is so that China's security environment is not a zero-sum game, but a win-win development.

This will not only be conducive to regional prosperity and stability in the Asia-Pacific, but will also be in line with China's own national interests.

The recent and still ongoing debate among Chinese think-tanks and news media regarding China's Japan policy is a healthy phenomenon and should be encouraged. There are already visible changes in the Japan policy under Beijing's new leadership.

Finally, policy emphasis should be put not only on the official relationship, but also on person-to-person contacts.

One of the most important ideas I learnt from my European colleagues was the concept of 'starting from youth'. France and Germany send a large number of students from primary, middle and high schools for homestays in the other country, so as to obtain first-hand knowledge of that country while they are young.

It is time for China and Japan (as well as other Asian countries) to be involved actively in similar programmes. In this way, China-Japan relations will be pushed to new, multi-dimensional, multi-channelled and multi-layered heights.

The writer is professor and division director of Comparative and Regional Studies and Director of the Center for Asian Studies at the American University in Washington DC. He is also associate-in-research at Harvard University's Fairbank Centre for East Asian Research.