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Peace in Pieces: The Failure of Peace Agreements in Rwanda and Sierra Leone

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Introduction

The signing of a peace agreement is always a historic cause for celebration in post-conflict countries in Africa, but their terms repeatedly fail to achieve the peace that they intend to create. Since 1970, the continent has experienced thirty wars, most of them civil conflicts.¹ Their causes are as diverse as their histories, and in most cases, they include high concentrations of neo-patrimonial power, weak political institutions, repressive militaries, and fragile economies. All too often in Africa, peace only represents the time between phases of violent conflict.² Even much of the so-called “peace-building” activities, coined by the plethora of international aid donors sent in to “help” African countries re-establish some semblance of statehood and provide basic humanitarian needs, are narrowly defined and often do not attempt to significantly alter the economic, political, or social structures that produced the conflict in the first place. During peace negotiations, the standing government and warring factions often commit similar errors.

By examining the peace agreements of Rwanda (1993) and Sierra Leone (1999), trends on the use and abuse of warring factions to participate in negotiations with the standing government become apparent. Both of these treaties demonstrate a limited understanding of what peace is and how it relates to justice. Although each advocates a different route to a peaceful future for its respective country, they both fail to address anything other than the immediate causes of the conflicts that wreaked havoc throughout their territories. Violence continued despite the signing of these agreements, and in the case of Rwanda, it increased by ten-fold into a full-scale genocide only a few months afterward. These two peace

agreements were chosen specifically for this reason.^a How did the unique features of these negotiations lead to their failure? If peace agreements establish peace, why did the agreements of Rwanda and Sierra Leone fail? What aspects of these agreements illustrate a limited and counter-intuitive understanding of peace? While historical hindsight demonstrates their obvious failings, this paper maintains that these agreements contained inherent flaws.

This paper argues that these agreements cannot establish peace as they intended due to inherent flaws within their definition, focus, and influence. First, a limited understanding of peace and justice prevents the negotiating parties from considering positive structural changes needed to establish peace beyond disarmament. Second, the parties place too much emphasis on political power-sharing and reorganization, thereby perpetuating the belief (and reality) that the successful use of violence secures power. Finally, international influences on political and economic liberalization before political institutionalization position the post-conflict state for future failure.

While the aforementioned reasons are not an exhaustive explanation of the absence of peace in these countries, they do highlight an unspoken paradigm that dominates African politics and any attempt to establish peace on the continent. Until leaders can act on a new consciousness surrounding the meaning of peace and its place in every sphere of public life, the ideal that peace represents will remain elusive. This is especially relevant for cases like Kenya, whose recent political upheaval illustrates the frailty of its assumed status as a “peaceful democracy.” There needs to be further examination of these terms in order to guide post-conflict societies in scrutinizing previously held assumptions about these issues.

This paper will begin with a brief explanation of the terms ‘peace,’ ‘conflict,’ and ‘justice,’ and how they differ from general conceptions. Next there is an explanation of why the peace agreements of Rwanda and Sierra Leone did not lead to sustainable peace in those countries. In conclusion, this paper briefly describes the paradigm shift that needs to occur in order for other governments to prioritize peace within an international policy framework.

Defining Peace, Justice, and Conflict

In his book *Peace Paradigms*, Abdul Karim Bangura lays out five broad conceptions of how peace has been achieved throughout Western recorded history: (1) power and coercion, (2) world order, (3) nonviolence, (4) conflict resolution, and (5) personal/community transformation.³ This outline also maps the evolving approach to peace over time, which according to Johan Galtung, allowed the field of Peace Studies to recently establish itself as a

means to channel conflict energy into a positive, non-violent, constructive, and transforming direction.⁴ From the perspective of both of these researchers, peace is not an ideal destination reached only by the morally enlightened few, but a process designed for everyone on every level of interaction to enhance human ability to develop toward our higher potential.

There are two generally understood categories of peace within the Peace and Conflict Resolution field of study. Negative peace, as characterized by Robert Elias and Jennifer Turpin, is the traditional notion of peace. They define it as “the absence of war or other direct violence.”⁵ This perception of peace as the opposite of war is usually the general understanding of the term by military analysts, but by focusing attention on the mechanisms and implementation of war, policymakers fail to consider the depth and diversity of the peaceful side of the peace-violence spectrum. Elias and Turpin address the depth and diversity of peace in their definition of positive peace as an extension of “the definition of negative peace by insisting on the promotion of social justice.”⁶ Therefore, peace is not simply about avoiding war; it is also about preserving and promoting human dignity.

Bangura continues this differentiation by arguing that positive peace is a more constructive conceptualization. He states that “in a world of positive peace, fear is not the basis of stability; societies are at positive peace when people have the means to control their own social, economic, and political lives.”⁷ In other words, inalienable rights, such as those found in the U.S. Declaration of Independence, provide a basis for the pursuit of happiness, but do not yet exist in the day-to-day activities of most people in the world. The process of allowing and insisting on the recognition of those rights, individually and institutionally, is the quest of peace building. Scholar Mary Perkins reminds one that, “we have to realize peace building is a gradual and organic process. Peace will not be established overnight.”⁸ While negative peace is surely a necessary starting point, advocates cannot stop there if they are looking for the benefits of positive peace to reverberate throughout the world.

Recognizing these conceptions of peace also leads to a new understanding of conflict and justice. Although conflict is not the opposite of peace, violence can be because not all conflicts are violent. Galtung defines the experience of rising conflict when “there are incompatible goals, [or] contradictions, as human as life itself. If the conflict is sufficiently deep and not resolved or transformed, then it may enter a violent phase. Conflicts cannot be prevented, but violence can.”⁹ The process of peace-building needs to accommodate the reconciliation of such incompatible goals to avoid violence, enhance relationships, and strengthen the sense of control that people feel over their own future.

Unfortunately, when violence does occur, a process is needed to acknowledge the wrong that has taken place and for the perpetrator to accept responsibility for the wrong

committed. Here, too, there are two prevailing conceptions of justice: retributive and restorative. According to the Initiative for Inclusive Security,¹⁰ retributive justice prioritizes the principle of punishment to those who have committed human rights violations through a formal legal proceeding. Alternatively, restorative justice is a process in which all those affected by an offense – victims, perpetrators, and by-standing communities – collectively deal with the consequences by focusing not on punishment but on repairing the damage done and offering restitution. Both of these understandings of justice come with their own assumptions and rhetorical influences, but retributive justice is the one most often applied following major violent acts.

Some argue that retributive justice is essential to peace because peace cannot exist without justice. As Trudy Govier argues in her book *Taking Wrongs Seriously*, the general approach to obtaining justice is a process that should be questioned. She states, “it is nearly always assumed in such arguments that justice is punitive justice...to achieve justice in this sense requires that offenders be brought to a court of law.”¹¹ Govier’s argument is that justice is not equal to the punitive legal procedures that Western democracies are accustomed to implementing. There is more to justice than these proceedings, and separating the value from this process allows one to reevaluate the action to obtain the ideal. Restorative processes are an alternative to retributive methods, but neither exhausts the possible avenues that exist to obtain justice.

The terms ‘peace,’ ‘conflict,’ and ‘justice’ appear overwhelmingly in post-conflict peace agreements. The way these terms are used implies a certain level of understanding of how to transform the ideals into policies. In the analysis of the agreements below, their frameworks are judged from the position that they defined peace as negative peace, conflict as violence, and justice in retributive terms, if indeed they have defined it all. As a result, their desire to create a document that would initiate a process for positive peace often failed. These three crucial concepts serve as the foundation of my critique of Rwanda and Sierra Leone’s peace agreements, and their methods for establishing positive peace, resolving violent conflict, and obtaining justice.

Rwanda and the Arusha Accords

In October 1990, approximately seven thousand Tutsi-Rwandan exiles, calling themselves the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), invaded Rwanda from neighboring Uganda to overthrow the Rwandan government.¹² Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana had previously committed himself to reconciliation between the Hutu and Tutsi ethno-political groups, but upon hearing of the invasion, his administration shifted its stance to uphold the Hutu position.¹³ Many Hutu in Rwanda feared that if the Tutsi returned to the country, they

would promptly take over political and economic power as they did throughout the post-colonial period, leaving the Hutu, the ethno-political majority and historical working class, without power. To combat this, “Hutu propaganda against the Tutsi became extreme. Radios broadcasted that the country was in danger of being taken over by a foreign race,” and encouraged regular Hutus to take up arms and defend their country by killing Tutsis.¹⁴ After the repulsion of the immediate invasion by Rwandan government forces, the RPF reverted to guerrilla tactics. Sporadic fighting continued until July 1992, when the parties negotiated a cease-fire agreement with mediation assistance from the Organization of African Unity (OAU).¹⁵ After a year of continued negotiations, the RPF and the Rwandan government signed a comprehensive peace accord in Arusha, Tanzania in August 1993, hereinafter called the Arusha Accords, or the Accords.

The Arusha Accords provided for the creation of a transitional government incorporating a power-sharing arrangement between the Tutsi and Hutu, the integration of the two armies, the return of refugees to Rwanda, and the organization of parliamentary elections for 1995. The provisions of the Arusha Accords were to be supervised by an impartial international force led by the United Nations.¹⁶ Unfortunately, the Arusha Accords devoted little attention to the country’s economic policies, which had been encouraged by international financial institutions in the early 1990s to implement structural adjustment programs. These programs began at the same time that the Arusha Accords were to be implemented, resulting in “a dual process of political and economic liberalization in the early 1990s, largely at the behest of international agencies and Western states.”¹⁷

Scholar Mahmood Mamdani argues that the Arusha Accords were doomed to fail because Hutu Power extremists portrayed the negotiations as talks between the internal opposition and the RPF, “that is between the RPF and its internal Hutu accomplices.”¹⁸ Mamdani further argues that four parts of the final agreement provided unequal advantage to the RPF, which further compounded Hutu Power advantage to dismiss the Arusha Accords.

The first was the provision on merging the two armies: these stipulated that the RPF would provide 40 percent of the soldiers in the new national army. When the army had ballooned into six times its original size in four years of civil war, and when the country was plagued with massive unemployment, this was literally like serving an unemployment notice to young recruits in the army. The second was that the RPF was given charge of the important Ministry of the Interior [giving] RPF decisive control over forces of coercion in the new state. Third, the power-sharing agreement excluded the organized Hutu Power tendency, CDR, from taking any seats in Parliament. A fourth relevant part of the peace agreement was the provision that recognized the right of return of all refugees. This was the fodder that Hutu Power media used to convince the population that the opposition had in fact sold the nation.¹⁹

From the perspective of those at the negotiating table, these arrangements brought a balance of power and provided a beginning for reconciliation between the Tutsi and Hutu.

Unfortunately, the powerful organizations left out of the talks, namely the Hutu Committee for the Defense of the Republic (CDR), would later destabilize the entire agreement. Or as Mamdani writes, “the irony is that while Arusha was central to the opposition claim that it held the key to end the civil war...Arusha in reality confirmed the Hutu Power claim that the opposition had betrayed the nation.”²⁰ It was from this sense of betrayal that Hutus took up arms, resulting in the mass murder of eight hundred thousand to one million Tutsi and Hutu moderates in the country between March and July of 1994.²¹

The Arusha Accords are a unique example of the worst-case failings of negotiated peace agreements that led to violent conflict so soon *after* they are signed. They illustrate the horribly negative results that are possible when the agreement does not include all the major players or address the sources of conflict. While it is obvious that not every imperfect peace agreement results in genocide, the Arusha Accords do provide some evidence of how negotiated agreements can fail before implementation because they lack the tangible processes for a positive peace.

In the Accords, the term ‘peace’ rarely plays a dual role to signify both the negative and positive conceptions of peace. In its opening statement, the parties plainly state that the Agreement is an effort toward a political settlement to end the war, and omitted any reference to peace as anything more than the disarmament and reintegration of the Tutsi into Rwanda. The Arusha Accords states that the parties are “firmly resolved to find a political[ly] negotiated solution to the war situation confronting the Rwand[an] people...to help [them] recover peace.”²² There are few places in the Arusha Accords that include a broader definition of peace. When broader definitions of peace are included, they are usually framed in future commitments such as upholding human rights. Such principles constitute “the basis and consistency of a lasting peace awaited by the Rwand[an] people for the benefit of the present and future generations.”²³ By far, most references to peace imply only the absence of war through a push for disarmament. Due to these limited understandings of peace and few, if any, references to justice,²⁴ the negotiating parties of the conflict failed to consider the structural mechanisms that would have facilitated the establishment of positive peace.

A second reason that the Arusha Accords failed to implement positive peace lies in the Accords’ primary focus on political power-sharing without attempting to change how the political structure operated. This focus also perpetuated the belief (and reality) that the successful use of violence secures political power. In the agreement, “the two parties accept the principle of power-sharing within the framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government.” This allowed the RPF to incorporate itself within current political and

military institutions, fostering a mix of Tutsi and Hutu participants in the political structure. While there were various actors that did not want Tutsi involvement in the political spheres,²⁵ the agreement never questioned that the structure itself was flawed and assumed that the only change needed was the composition of political actors. In his article on Post-Settlement Governance Programmes, Bruce Baker argues that there needs to be more emphasis on governance followed by the reformation of democratic institutions. He claims that if the authoritarian (or neo-patrimonial in the African context) style of governance injects itself into democratic proceedings, then that style does not necessarily transform into democracy.²⁶ Instead, Baker recommends concrete structural changes to strengthen the legislature, establish a legal framework for citizens' rights, and reform public administration to promote structural good governance.²⁷ However, he cautions:

...the fundamental problem is that the principals of good governance, namely fairness, participation, transparency, effectiveness, accountability, legitimacy, and rule of law are more normative than technical issues. Fair elections do not guarantee fair governments; representative electoral systems do not automatically bring 'representative-ness' ...Without it good governance institutions cannot operate effectively.²⁸

Despite the best intentions of the Arusha Accords its focus on power-sharing initiatives that did not include all parties in the conflict would not have touched upon any of these needed changes in governance had they even had the opportunity to be implemented.

Throughout Rwandan history, different regimes have held on to power for only as long as they can repress opposition groups. During the country's colonial era, this centralized power was usually held by the Tutsi because the Belgians - as colonial rulers - considered them to be the superior African race, and *racialized* what had been a political and historical identity.²⁹ It was not until 1959, when there occurred a social revolution calling for the reversal of the Tutsi and Hutu political roles, that the Hutu formed a "racialized nationalism [that] victimized the Tutsis." This prompted thousands of Tutsi to flee to neighboring states, and the Hutu eventually proclaimed Rwanda as a Hutu country.³⁰ In the late 1980s, there was talk of reconciliation between the Tutsi and Hutu, but civil war erupted before these talks could take place.³¹ Despite the demographic composition of the warring parties, authors Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz argue that "political conflicts, however brutal, are relatively straightforward struggles for power which are considered legitimate by a significant proportion of the populations that support the warring parties."³² Such contests for power repeat themselves in African history, and reflect the use of war to gain political power. These paradigms do not shift after signing peace agreements. If anything, they reinforce conceptions within society that a group can coerce its way into political power.

While misconceptions about peace and the emphasis on political power restructuring may fail to achieve positive peace, these aspects of the Arusha Accords failed because of the signing parties and external pressure from international actors who had their own interests at stake in the peace settlement. Beginning in the 1980s, “intergovernmental organizations, international civil society and international private commercial interests play[ed] an increasing role over the management of national affairs” in Africa.³³ One common theme among these external players was the promotion of economic and political liberalization within various individual countries. The international community’s insistence on liberalization before these countries were able to institutionalize their own political and economic systems led to serious damage to societies across the continent.

For countries like Rwanda that have recently experienced a civil war, the case for liberalization is even bleaker. As scholar Roland Paris argues:

[P]eacebuilding missions in the 1990s were guided by a generally unstated but widely accepted theory of conflict management: the notion that promoting ‘liberalization’ in countries that had recently experienced civil war would help to create the conditions for a stable and lasting peace. [However], international efforts to transform war-shattered states have, in a number of cases, inadvertently fueled [further] violence in these countries.”³⁴

Other scholars share this same sentiment. Chabal and Daloz contend that “given how porous the state is, the current pressures to liberalize the economy and introduce multi-party electoral systems are likely to conspire to allow even greater scope for the privatization of the illicit, a process which further reinforces the power of this shadowy entrepreneurial elite.”³⁵ In the political realm, liberalization often signifies the creation of democratic institutions and the promotion of ‘free and fair’ elections. In the economic realm, liberalization often means marketization, or a “movement toward a market-oriented economic model, including measures aimed at minimizing government intrusion in the economy, and maximizing the freedom for private investors, producers and consumers to pursue their interests.”³⁶ As I have argued earlier, focusing on the creation of democratic institutions before educating the people on democratic governance will surely have little impact on the sustainability of the “reformed” democratic state, much less on the establishment of positive peace. Likewise, implementing a foreign economic model into an economy recently emerging from war might provide cheaper goods in the short-term, but it most likely will impose negative long-term impacts on the ability of the domestic economy to compete with cheap imports or diversify its export commodities. Assumptions from the international donor community that political and economical liberalization assist in the

establishment of positive peace exist only as naïve hope. Such policies not only further destabilize post-conflict countries, but they harm their ability to enact sustainable domestic reforms in the future.

The Arusha Accords signed by the government of Rwanda and the RPF in August of 1993 could not bring positive peace to the people of Rwanda. First, the inherent misconception of peace as only the absence of war, the parties were limited in their ability to design programs that would resolve some of the fundamental problems that created the conflict in the first place. Second, the agreement's inability to propose reforms to the standing political institutions by focusing instead on the political composition severely harmed its capacity to bring peace to Rwanda. Finally, the international community's insistence on implementing foreign models of "liberalization" within the economic and political sectors continues to limit the effectiveness of domestic policies that could assist in producing positive structural changes to establish positive peace in Rwanda.

Sierra Leone and the Lomé Accords

Taking advantage of the general civil unrest within the country following decades of economic and political exploitation, a rebel force (predominantly urban lumpens with criminal or military backgrounds)³⁷ led by Foday Sankoh began waging civil war on the Sierra Leonean government in March 1991.³⁸ The rebels, calling themselves the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), primarily declared war against the current administration, which was headed by the All People's Congress (APC) and its leader, President Joseph Momoh. Backed financially by Charles Taylor, the leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, this relationship would play a significant role throughout the war. At the time, the RUF announced its support for a true democracy, and equal rights and freedoms for Sierra Leoneans. Some scholars, however, argue that the brutal tactics used by the RUF were "committed again and again precisely because of the social composition of [the] movement and the lack of a concrete program of societal transformation,"³⁹ thus calling into question the aforementioned support. The RUF utilized horrific measures to gain the attention of the APC government. "Brutal amputations, mass rape, and abductions became factors for the formation of other groups [such as the] Civil Defense Forces, Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), Kamajours, and West Side Boys."⁴⁰ As militia leaders splintered from these and other military forces, inter-group fighting increased "as the civil war transitioned into a brutal pursuit of survival."⁴¹ Trust and security nearly became extinct as *sobel*s (unpaid government soldiers by day and rebels by night) began to emerge and wrought havoc by looting, killing, and destroying communities.

In 1992, the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces overthrew President Momoh in response to his failure to pay the military, and during that same year, the RUF gained control of the Kono region and its vast diamond wealth. “Massive disorder and anarchy continued to spread as the various factions fought for control and influence by targeting civilians.”⁴² In 1996, an election ultimately named Ahmed Tejan Kabbah as the new president. During the months leading up to the election, RUF forces prevented citizens from voting by chopping off arms and hands, and then delivered these dismembered appendages to the steps of government buildings.⁴³ After a brief coup d’état by the AFRC, which heightened the RUF’s terror campaign, Kabbah was reinstated as president, and after multiple attempts to negotiate peace, an agreement was finally signed on July 7, 1999.

The Lomé Accords, so named because the negotiations took place in Lomé, Togo, granted “absolute and free pardon and reprieve of all combatants including those in the RUF” and arguably took years to completely implement.⁴⁴ This agreement called for an immediate cease-fire, allowed RUF members to serve within political sectors of the government, created various commissions to supervise these and other new institutions, and designed programs aimed at establishing peace as a means of economic and political security. The legislation of the Lomé Accords led to the creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and eventually the Special Court of Sierra Leone, which tried persons who bore the most responsibility for committing serious war crimes.

The Lomé Accords, however, disregarded its attempts to negotiate for peace for the same three reasons as the Arusha Accords. Despite the fact that the war in Sierra Leone lasted longer and involved crueler tactics than the one in Rwanda, the Lomé Accords failed to present a sustainable framework for peace because it did not define peace as anything more than the absence of violence (and failed to consider justice at all). Second, the agreement only focused on incorporating the RUF into the current political structure without examining the structure for problems. And third, the agreement fell under the influence of the international community, which simultaneously pushed for economic and political liberalization. Each of these reasons limited the agreement’s ability to foster sustainable peace in Sierra Leone.

The very limited understanding of peace and justice prevented the negotiating parties from considering the positive structural changes needed to establish peace beyond disarmament. The agreement states that the parties are “determined to establish sustainable peace and security... to settle all past, present and future differences and grievances by peaceful means; and to refrain from the threat and use of armed force to bring about any change in Sierra Leone.”⁴⁵ Yet the majority of the agreement’s articles concern military and political power-sharing among the government and RUF forces. For example, Article IX is disturbing in that it provides full pardon and amnesty to all combatants involved in the war. Not only are

such agreements unwarranted, but they perpetuate injustice and disregard for the establishment of humanitarian law. In fact, the Lomé Accords mention the word ‘justice’ only once, and it is within the context of enabling the RUF to head various cabinet positions within the new government, with the ‘Justice’ department being one of them.

Although the term “reconciliation” is used more often, the agreement concedes that the process will take more time and leaves the responsibility of reconciliation to a new Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP), which later birthed the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). However, these institutions have had mixed results in bringing justice and reconciliation to Sierra Leoneans. As authors Bruce Baker and Roy May argue, “most Sierra Leoneans were very divided about the TRC and truth telling...field research found that most people since the war wanted to forget. Indeed, for many (including many victims) the TRC was an obstacle to healing and reconciliation.”⁴⁶ While there are different techniques for reconciling ex-combatants, it seems that the national method interrupted that process for many people. The lack of attention to what peace is or how it is established produces an agreement that fails to achieve positive peace; the same is true for justice. It is unfortunate that the Lomé Accords failed to recognize this.

The Lomé Accords focused overwhelmingly on how to alter the political composition without significantly changing any political structures. Much like Rwanda, the lack of attention to *how* the country is governed, and not just by *who*, failed to reach the authors of the peace agreement. Failure to change the innate structure of the government will simply cause history - and its consequences - to repeat itself with respect to the over centralization of power within the country. Scholar Roland Paris describes it this way:

Sierra Leone’s history of political instability and violence is a story of rival factions competing for total power in a system of “winner-take-all” politics where ruling groups use their control of the state to enrich themselves and their associates while brutally suppressing their opponents. This style of politics has resulted in a vicious cycle of violent uprisings and coups, followed by repression and embezzlement, which give rise to new uprisings and new coups. If democratization is to provide Sierra Leone with an escape from this cycle of violence, such mechanisms as an effective constitutional court are needed to prevent the government from reverting to one-party rule.”⁴⁷

Nevertheless, written as it is, the agreement will most likely retain the status quo of the current power structure. The only change would concern who happens to be sitting at the negotiating table. This is especially true at the local level as “thorough modernization of Sierra Leone’s local government system would therefore seem to be an essential prerequisite for any lasting peace.”⁴⁸ If the problem lies in the country’s patrimonial system, then it is

likely that there will be another generation of frustrated politicians who use war as a means to improve their own access to power unless significant structural changes occur.

As in Rwanda, many international donors involved in the agreement's negotiations participated on assumption that the economic and political liberalization would be able to bring peace and security. Such liberalization processes are extremely volatile and should not be implemented in post-conflict states for this reason. After calling for elections, the international community "focused on one vital institution of the Sierra Leone government – the army – and made it more effective in order to deter and suppress violent challenges to the electoral process or [to] its results."⁴⁹ Regrettably, these same actors did little to establish functioning governmental institutions in Sierra Leone prior to the elections, and this "seems likely to become a source of problems in the future."⁵⁰ Because the international community assisted in holding elections and opened up the market to receive more imports, it does not mean that the country is achieving peace. As Roland Paris cautions, "Sierra Leone has emerged from a period of appalling brutality, and an opportunity now exists to set the country on a path toward stable and lasting peace. The international community should resist the temptation to declare the peacebuilding mission a completed 'success' on grounds that Sierra Leone is now a 'democracy.'"⁵¹

Sierra Leone's civil war has come to an end, but peace has yet to arrive in the country. Indeed, the absence of war is not the absence of pain, trauma, or physical destruction, all of which remain in the country's psychological and geographical landscape.⁵² The Lomé Accords continue to be hailed as the historic beginning of the end of war, but they failed to establish positive peace due to the lack of comprehensive definitions pertaining to peace and justice, an emphasis on political power-sharing rather than on political reorganization, and international actors mistakenly advocating economic and political liberalization over good governance. Although it remains unclear whether the Truth and Reconciliation Commission brought closure to those who experienced the horrors of war, it falls short of implementing the structural changes needed for social justice and sustainable positive peace.

Conclusion

When parties of a civil war come together to establish a new, formal government that is both democratic and sustainable, negotiators have at their disposal many recommended courses of action to consider. Some of those recommendations have been addressed in this paper; they include redefining what 'peace' and 'justice' mean, advocating for new political mechanisms in order to enhance good governance, and curbing the international community's preference for liberalization ahead of institutionalization. However, such significant changes cannot

occur without a shift in how one thinks about conflict resolution. While it is outside the scope of this paper to produce suggestions for procedural change, I attempt to illustrate the underlying requirements. By doing so, we can begin to examine why the standard practices surrounding negotiated peace agreements need to shift, and how the production of such agreements presents an opportunity to create a new kind of governance based on the ideals of positive peace.

If one limits the understanding of peace to mean the absence of war, then ‘peace-building’ is a straightforward term concerned with creating the mechanisms needed to promote that absence. However, if one understands peace from the positive perspective, then “peace-building” presents a very different meaning that includes the negative conception in addition to enhancing social justice and structural reforms. The shift that occurs is not just about grasping the intellectual differences; it is also about assisting in institutional design based on the positive conception. This change needs to occur within both individuals and national bodies. Imagine how a country might transform if its citizens’ conception of peace shifted from negative to positive. How would expectations change? What kind of restructuring would institutions undergo? In what ways would the implementation of policies transform?

Bangura offers that “the process of establishing positive peace will require global negotiations and cooperation. Thus, international institutions, national governments, non-governmental organizations and private businesses would collaborate to build a world where positive peace is a goal of policy making.”⁵³ It is apparent that our current global structure is not conducive to the goal of positive peace, but it does not mean that countries like Rwanda and Sierra Leone cannot begin to move towards that direction. Paris agrees, noting that “what is needed is a paradigm shift to a more integrated approach among institutions engaged in peacebuilding.”⁵⁴ Such a shift in the intellectual understanding of positive peace, as well as a newfound dedication to implement it, will assist any country wishing to achieve that end.

Endnotes

¹ Oliver Furley and Roy May, *Ending Africa’s Wars: Progressing to Peace* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), 31.

² *Ibid.*, 228.

³ Abdul Karim Bangura, *Peace Paradigms* (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 2005), 8.

⁴ Johan Galtung and Carl G. Jacobsen, *Searching for Peace: The Road to Transcend* (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 107.

⁵ Bangura, *Peace Paradigms*, 5.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁸ Mary Perkins, *Growing into Peace: A Manual for Peace-Builders in the 1990s and*

Beyond (Herts, UK: George Ronald, 1991), 8.

⁹ Galtung and Jacobsen, *Searching for Peace*, 107.

¹⁰ Handout received from training on Transitional Justice by the Initiative for Inclusive Security, Thursday November 29, 2007, page 1.

¹¹ Trudy Govier, *Taking Wrongs Seriously: Acknowledgment, Reconciliation and the Politics of Sustainable Peace* (Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 2006), 134-135.

¹² Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 70.

¹³ Govier, *Taking Wrongs Seriously*, 262.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Paris, *At War's End*, 70.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., 72.

¹⁸ Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 210.

¹⁹ Ibid., 210-211.

²⁰ Ibid., 211.

²¹ Govier, *Taking Wrongs Seriously*, 259.

²² Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ There are a few broad references to reconciliation between the Tutsi and the Hutu and returning refugees from each group that the parties say that "they further undertake to spare no effort to promote National Unity and Reconciliation." However, I would argue that references like these fail to suggest any strong commitment to structural change in the way that institutions will relate to Hutu and Tutsi and how they relate to each other upon the signing of this agreement.

²⁵ At the time Hutu Power advocates were strongly against any power-sharing mechanisms, equating that with political suicide (Mamdani 208). Various moderate Hutu politicians recognized how the governments' middle ground of ethnic reconciliation was eroding and accused the government of "coming under the control of a narrow group of extremists who dominated all aspects of Rwanda's public life for their personal gain and were fighting to protect their hold on power" (Mamdani 209).

²⁶ Furley and May, *Ending Africa's Wars*, 35.

²⁷ Ibid., 36.

²⁸ Ibid., 42.

²⁹ Govier, *Taking Wrongs Seriously*, 260.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid., 261.

³² Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument* (Oxford: James Currey & Indiana University Press, 1999), 83.

³³ Furley and May, *Ending Africa's Wars*, 34.

³⁴ Paris, *At War's End*, 5-6.

³⁵ Chabal and Daloz, *Africa Works*, 91.

³⁶ Roland Paris, *At War's End*, 5.

³⁷ See Abdullah, Ibrahim Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War, 57.

³⁸ Govier, *Taking Wrongs Seriously*, 268.

³⁹ Abdullah, 59.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 269.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., 270.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone

⁴⁶ Furley and May, *Ending Africa's Wars*, 228-229.

⁴⁷ Paris, *At War's End*, 224.

⁴⁸ Richard Fanthorpe, "Neither Citizen Nor Subject? 'Lumpen' Agency and the Legacy of Native Administration in Sierra Leone." *African Affairs*, 386 (2001).

⁴⁹ Paris, *At War's End*, 223.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid., 225.

⁵² Furley and May, *Ending Africa's Wars*, 223.

⁵³ Bangura, *Peace Paradigms* (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 2005), 7.

⁵⁴ Paris, *At War's End*, 230.