Russian influence is reasonably pervasive, and with the resurgence of Russian power, even NATO or EU countries fear to anger Russia on issues in an area, which is seen as Russia’s sphere of influence. Russia poses an increasing threat to its neighbors in central and Eastern Europe in both energy and political security, although the threat is significantly more serious for countries, which are not yet NATO or EU member states. However, Russia’s bullying stance on energy and political matters is bad for both these countries and for the broader international community. In addition, the support of Russia for breakaway republics in the Caucuses creates both a severe military and political threat to the countries of the region. These threats look set to increase with the nationalistic, sabre-rattling policies of the K One key threat, which Russia currently poses to countries in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as to other EU member states is in the area of energy security. Putin has publicly stated that Russia’s energy reserves are to be used as a tool remlin.
“… [aimed] at furthering the geopolitical interests and maintaining the national security of Russia. (Putin 2005)”
The energy business has become the focal point of Russia’s foreign policy strategy, and has been used consistently for political gain. The EU imports 50% of its gas and 30% of its oil from Russia, making it hugely dependent on Russia. Non-EU members in central and eastern Europe are even more dependent on Russian energy supplies. In addition to Russia energy supplies, almost all Central Asian gas flows through Russian pipelines, increasing Russian control over this vital resource (East West Institute 2006). Most countries in Central and Eastern Europe are therefore hopelessly dependent on Russian energy, which makes them open to political pressure from the Kremlin on a number of issues.
For the most part, the energy business is directly controlled from the Kremlin, with state-owned companies such as Gazprom at the forefront of energy distribution. Russian control over pipelines is strong, as laws prohibiting foreign control of pipelines (the subsoil law) are in effect, and Russia refuses to sign the Energy Charter, which would require liberalization of the energy market (Milov 2006). These companies are themselves a threat to countries in Central and Eastern Europe, as they are aggressively expanding into that region, taking over former national energy companies and controlling pipelines and supply routes. They also frequently interfere in the political affairs of other nations, acting as pressure groups or lobbying interests. Non-EU member states in the region are at the mercy of the energy conglomerates, as the prices can be adjusted or supply cut without warning. The well-publicized case of Ukraine, where gas supplies have been cut over payment issues twice in the last two years is one example of this. Russia has also cut the energy supplies to Georgia, and recently, a consortium of Russian energy companies have taken total control of the energy infrastructure inside Georgia (Institute of Energy Policy 2006). The total dependence of many of the states of Central and Eastern Europe on Russia for energy weakens them greatly, and can be a major threat to economic prosperity and, in cold winters, to the people themselves.
However, what makes this hold over countries of the region so dangerous is the fact that Russia willingly uses energy as a bargaining chip in its political dealings. As mentioned before, most of the energy companies take their orders directly from Moscow, and the Russian government has shown itself adept at using energy as a mainstay of foreign policy (Institute of Energy Policy 2006). Energy has allowed the Russian government to regain its place on the world stage, and despite talk by western governments of “pipeline circumvention” (i.e., funneling Central Asian Gas directly through the Caucuses or Turkey, bypassing Russia) through the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan or Blue Stream pipelines, Russia’s supremacy in energy is largely unchallenged. Russia has used energy to compel countries to support it, or to protest developments it disapproves of. Again, the Ukrainian case of 1996 was most likely a political reaction to the newly pro-western government, which came to power in the Orange Revolution (Tymoshenko 2007). The use of energy as a political tool in Russia’s near abroad is a dangerous threat. Dependence on Russian energy leaves countries vulnerable to pressure from the Kremlin, and may prevent these countries from developing links with NATO and the EU, or forming their own autonomous economic groupings.
Russia also poses a political threat to her neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe, and in a few specific cases, a military threat. The Russian support for breakaway regions in Georgia and elsewhere, as well as recent military actions within Georgia destabilizes the internal politics of these countries. In addition, Russian political interference in the politics of these countries is an ongoing threat to stability. Russian support for the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia within Georgia is a detriment to Georgia’s ability to conduct its own affairs. Russia has stationed “peacekeepers” there under the guise of a CIS mandate, and has granted the citizens of these enclaves Russian citizenship and passports (The Economist 2008). Similar efforts exist in Transnistria in Moldova, despite generally good relations between the Russian and Moldovan governments. This is part of Russia’s ongoing efforts to reestablish itself in the former Soviet republics, especially territories which were once part of the Russian Empire (Simes, 2007). The Kremlin has openly stated that if Kosovo can become free, why should these other disputed territories not receive the same options? The circumstances are not entirely different, although there have been significantly fewer problems with ethnic violence. However, it suits Russia to support these enclaves as a political tool, which can be used against Georgia (The Economist 2008).
Militarily, Russia poses a severe threat in Georgia and Moldova, however small. Recent sabre-rattling between Russia and Georgia has led to fears of a military confrontation in Abkhazia. Moscow has built up its forces in the region, and Georgia’s government, as well as the international community, have expressed concern that this maybe the prelude to a military attack. It certainly constitutes a partial blockade of Georgia. Incidents involving a shot-down probable Russian spy plane and an unexploded Russian bomb, which landed in a Georgian field, have only escalated tensions. It seems likely that these Russian actions are the result of the Georgian governments’ pro-western leanings (Dubnov, 2006). The Kremlin may be trying to discourage Georgia from entering NATO, or may even be trying to destabilize the government to replace it with a more pro-Russian one (The Economist, 2008). It would not be surprising if Russia were to increase the number of peacekeepers in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, or even to invoke Kosovo as an example permitting it to “intervene” on behalf of ethnic Russians in those regions. Either way, Russia’s use of military buildup in Abkhazia presents a serious threat to its neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe.
While the military concerns may be confined to a few small conflicts, Russian political interference is rife across the region. The Kremlin views the former Soviet Republics as its sphere of influence, and tends to interfere in their political processes to prevent decisions it does not like (Tymoshenko 2007). Interference in elections in Ukraine and Georgia led to colour revolutions in those countries, while recent Russian involvement in disputed elections in Armenia led to continued turmoil and violence along with allegations of a stolen election. Russia props up undemocratic regimes in Belarus and across Central Asia, and has only reluctantly accepted the loss of some states of Central and Eastern Europe to the European Union. This interference, when coupled with Russian influence and military/energy power, is a huge problem for the non-EU states of Central and Eastern Europe (Institute of Energy Policy 2006). Russia continues to interfere heavily in its neighboring states internal affairs, which destabilizes not only those governments, but their chances of moving towards NATO and the EU.
While the resurgence of Russia as a threat is mainly a concern for the smaller, poorer countries of Central and Eastern Europe at present, this threat is likely to expand in the future, and become more of a problem for EU member states and NATO. Even at the moment, NATO expansion is being delayed because of Russia. NATO and the EU are both unwilling to accept members which are seen as being within Russia’s sphere of influence, treating Russia as a de-facto imperial power (Asnus 2008). This is particularly noticeable in the case of Ukraine; at the recent conference, despite US support, NATO did not offer Ukraine a Membership Action Plan, in large part due to the objections of Russia. The EU is similarly avoiding any further expansion into post-Soviet states of Eastern Europe.
Russia has also been involved in a great deal of nationalistic sabre-rattling with countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as some more western nations such as Great Britain. There have been ongoing disputes over the expulsion of diplomats, the murder of a former Russian agent in London by Russian security services, and the closure by Russia of all offices of the British Council (an education organization) in the country. In addition, Putin’s rhetoric speaks of a rebirth of Russia to its former great power status (Simes 2007), and Russia is exerting more effort to try and achieve greater international recognition. At this year’s May Day parade in Moscow, ICBMs and Military Tanks were paraded for the first time since the fall of communism, signaling a return to a more nationalistic philosophy. All of these are signs of a greater threat, which may emerge in the future from Russia. While interference is largely confined to Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Central Asia, in the future, Russia may well try to influence events in the broader international community using energy or political manipulation as a bargaining chip. Russia may not be a threat for the west today, but it seems likely that it will be (Asnus 2008).
Therefore, it can be concluded that Russia is a threat to its non-EU neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe, using energy politics and political pressure to interfere in the internal affairs of these countries. Russia’s bullying military pressure on several states with breakaway republics also poses a small, yet significant military threat, which has the potential to ignite conflict in the region. Most of Russia’s interference is confined to smaller countries of the former Russian Empire, yet western countries could easily find themselves drawn into such a conflict. In the future, Russia’s jingoistic attitude may also make it a broader threat to the international community. With EU member states being so reliant on Russian energy supplies, they must do everything they can to prevent the threat of Russia’s resurgence from becoming even greater.
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